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Abstract 
The purpose of this paper is to investigate whether there is an optimal capital structure at which point firm is able to maximize its 
value. The author employ an advanced panel threshold regression estimation developed in 1999 by Hansen that will indicate 
whether there are positive and negative impacts of capital structure on firm value. The author has used data of among 90 unlisted 
Seafood Processing Enterprises in the South Central region of Vietnam (SEASCRs) during 2005–2011 period. The author has used 
book value of equity plus long- term debt (BVE) and return on equity (ROE) as surrogate for firm value and book value of total 
debt to total assets (TD/TA) as surrogate for capital structure and as the threshold variable. 
The empirical results strongly indicate that triple threshold effect exists between debt ratio and firm value when BVE is selected to 
proxy firm value. However, when ROE is selected to proxy firm value, the result shows that there exists double thresholds effect 
between debt ratio and firm value. From these results, the author  may conclude that the relationship between capital structure and 
firm value has a nonlinear relationship represents an convex Parapol shape. In addition, the findings suggest implications for 
SEASCRs on flexible usage of financial leverage. Specifically, SEASCRs should not use loans over 57.39%. To ensure and enhance 
the firm value, the scope of the optimal debt ratio should be less than 57.39%.  
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1. Introduction 
Since the 60 years, the relationship between capital structure and firm value has been the subject of considerable 
debate. The results of both theoretically and in empirical research formed three different perspectives on this 
relationship: (i) The capital structure is unrelated to firm value (Modigliani and Miller (1958), Phillips and 
Sipahioglu (2004), Walaa Wahid ElKelish (2007), Pornsit Jiraporn and Yixin Liu (2008)); (ii) The capital structure is 
related positive or negative to firm value (Modigliani and Miller (1963), Miller (1977), Myers and Majluf (1984), 
Joshua Abor (2005), R. Zeitun et al.(2007), Onaolapo et al.(2010), Ali Saeedi et al.(2011), Wenjuan Ruan et al.(2011), 
Nour Abu-Rub (2012), Abdul Ghafoor Khan (2012), Zuraidah Ahmad et al.(2012)). The results of these studies 
indicate that the enterprise value is a linear function of capital structure, means that the slope of the enterprise value is 
constant in all the different debt ratios. Means that regression functions are identical across all observations in a 
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sample; (iii) There exists an optimal capital structure for each enterprise (Myers (1977, 1984), Feng-Li Lin (2007), 
Chien-Chung Nieh et al.(2008), Yu-Shu Cheng et al.(2010), Cuong and Canh (2012), Ahmad and Abdullah (2013)).   
The South Central region of Vietnam stretches across 7 provinces and one coastal city, from Da Nang city to Binh 
Thuan province. This is the area where Seafood processing sector is the one of the most prominent sector of Vietnam 
that significantly contributes towards the economy in terms of creating employment, exports and its contribution in 
GDP. Characteristics of area's seafood processing enterprises are small-scale, newly-established, semi-manual labored, 
backward processing technology. The number of listed companies on the stock market is limited. Further, they present 
low profitability, high bankruptcy risk due to continuous natural disasters, output markets of numerous barriers, 
limited capital and so on. During 2010–2012, with the increase of interest rates, financial costs have significantly gone 
up in this years, resulting in decreasing profit of the firms, many businesses have closed and declared bankruptcy.  
From the above practices, study the effect of capital structure on firm value for SEASCRs will help the enterprises 
making the decisions of enterprise capital restructuring more suitable. Specifically, how to use debt reasonably, in 
which case the increasing debt is effective, in which case the debt limit to reduce risk, reduce the risk of damage to 
enterprises. It is, therefore, of a particular, interest to investigate the relationship between capital structure and firm 
value in a sample of SEASCRs.  
In this study, for the purpose of indicating the extent of capital structure, the debt will have a positive effect, increasing 
enterprise value; the extent of capital structure, the debt will have negative effects, reducing the value of the enterprise. 
This research applies the threshold regression model of Hansen (1999) to construct the threshold regression model to 
investigate the effect of capital structure on firm value for Seafood Processing Enterprises in the South Central Region 
of Vietnam.  
The paper is divided into six sections. The next section reviews the results of previous theoretical and empirical 
research. The third section provides the sample data and the variables. The fourth section discusses the methodology. 
Section 5 discusses the empirical results, and the final section summarizes the key findings and implications.  
2. Literature Review 
The capital structure of a firm concerns the mixture of debt and equity the firm uses in its operation. The relationship 
between capital structure and firm value has been the subject of considerable debate, both theoretically and in 
empirical research. Through out the literature, debates have focused on whether there is an optimum capital structure 
for an individual firm or whether the proportion or level of debt usage is irrelevant or relevant to the firm’s value.  
2.1. Theoretical Literature 
The debates on the relevance of capital structure to firm value has progressed from academic model to practical reality 
since Modigliani & Miller’s research (1958). In a frictionless and perfect markets world, the irrelevant capital 
structure of Modigliani and Miller (1958) argued that firm value was independent of firm capital structure, and there 
was no optimal capital structure for a specific firm. However, Modigliani and Miller’s (1958) perfect market 
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assumptions: such as no transaction costs, no taxes, symmetric information and identical borrowing rates, and risk free 
debt, were contradictory to the operations in the real world.  
In their subsequent paper, Modigliani and Miller (1963) relaxed their assumption by incorporating corporate tax 
benefits as determinants of the capital structure of firms. The key feature of taxation is the recognition of interest as a 
tax-deductible expense. A firm that pays taxes receives a partially offsetting interest “tax-shield” in the nature of lower 
taxes paid. In other words, the firm value is increased through the use of debt in the capital structure, due to the tax 
deductibility of interest payments on debt. This is a tacit admission in which capital structure affects firm value. 
Consequently, as Modigliani and Miller (1963) proposed, firms should use as much debt capital as possible to 
maximize their value. In analogous to Modigliani and Miller’s (1963) propositions, Miller (1977) incorporated both 
corporate taxes and personal taxes into his model. According to Miller (1977), the value of the firm depends on the 
relative level of each tax rate, compared with the other two. Miller (1977) indicated that relative level of each tax rate 
determines firm value, and that the gain from employing debt may be smaller than what was suggested in Modigliani 
and Miller (1963).  
The pecking order theory proposed by Myers and Majluf (1984), suggests that there is a hierarchy of firm preferences 
with regard to the financing of their investments and that there is no well-defined target debt ratio. The conclusion 
drawn from the pecking order theory is that there is a hierarchy of firm preferences with respect to the financing of 
their investments. This theory suggests that firms finance their needs, initially by using internally generated funds, i.e. 
undistributed earnings, where there is no existence of information asymmetry, next by less risky debt if additional 
funds are needed and lastly by risky external equity issue to cover any remaining capital requirements. The order of 
preferences reflects relative costs of finance to vary between the different sources of finance. Therefore, the pecking 
order theory indicates a negative relationship between profitability and debt.  
The static Trade-off theory was developed by Myers in 1977. Myers (1977, 1984) suggests that the optimal capital 
structure does exist. A value-maximizing firm will find an optimal capital structure by trading off benefits and costs of 
debt financing. Therefore, it values the company as the value of the firm if unlevered plus the present value of the tax 
shield minus the present value of bankruptcy and agency costs.  
2.2. Empirical Literature 
Table 1 shows the summary of the findings of previous authors related to the impact of  capital structure on firm value.  
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Table 1:  Previous findings on the impact of capital structure on firm value 
Author Findings 
Countr
y/Mark
ets 
The capital structure is unrelated to firm value 
Phillips et 
al. (2004) 
Empirical analysis revealed no significant relationship between the level of debt found in the capital structure 
(TD/TA) and financial performance (Tobin's Q).  
UK 
Walaa 
Wahid 
ElKelish 
(2007)  
Findings suggest that debt to equity ratio (TD/TE) has no impact on firm value (measured according to the 
Discounted Cash Flow model in perpetuity).   
United 
Arab 
Emirate
s 
Pornsit 
Jiraporn et 
al. (2008) 
The results demonstrate no significant adverse impact on firm value (Tobin's Q, ROA) due to excess leverage 
(TD/TA).  
USA 
The capital structure is related positive or negative to firm value 
Joshua 
Abor 
(2005) 
Found a positive relationship between capital structure (SD/TA, TD/TA) and firm performance (ROE). 
However, a negative relationship between capital structure (LD/TA) and ROE was found.  
Ghana 
R. Zeitun et 
al.(2007)  
Found a negative relationship between capital structure (SD/TA, LD/TA, TD/TA) and corporate performance 
(ROA, Tobin’Q).  
Jordan 
 
Onaolapo et 
al.(2010)  
Found a negative relationship between capital structure (TD/TA) and firm performance (ROA, ROE).  Nigeria 
Ali Saeedi 
et al.(2011)  
Findings suggest that firm performance (EPS, Tobin’s Q is significantly and positively associated with capital 
structure (SD/TA, LD/TA, TD/TA), while report a negative relation between capital structure and ROA. 
Moreover, there is no significant relationship between ROE and capital structure.  
Iran 
Wenjuan 
Ruan et 
al.(2011)  
Found that managerial ownership negatively impacts the ratio of total debt to total assets and the ratio of total 
debt to total assets negatively impacts firm value (Tobin’s Q).  
China 
Nour Abu-
Rub (2012)  
Found a positive relationship between capital structure (SD/TA, LD/TA, TD/TA, TD/TE) and firm performance 
(ROE, ROA, EPS, MBVR and Tobin’s Q). 
Palestin 
Zuraidah 
Ahmad et 
al.(2012) 
Found a negative relationship between capital structure (SD/TA, TD/TA) and firm performance (ROE, ROA). 
However, a positive relationship between capital structure (LD/TA) and ROE was found. 
Malaysi
a 
Abdul 
Ghafoor 
Khan 
(2012)  
Found a negative relationship between capital structure (SD/TA, TD/TA) and firm performance (ROA, Tobin’s 
Q). Moreover, there is no significant relationship between ROE and capital structure.  
Pakista
n 
There exists an optimal capital structure for each enterprise 
Feng-Li Lin 
(2007) 
Found that the optimal range of debt ratio (TD/TA) between 48.92% and 49.55% that increases firm value. 
(Tobin’s Q).  
Taiwan 
Chien-
Chung Nieh 
et al. 
(2008)  
Found that the optimal range of debt ratio (TD/TA)  between 12.37% and 28.70% that increases firm value 
(ROE, EPS).  
Taiwan 
Yu-Shu 
Cheng et al. 
(2010) 
Found that the optimal debt ratio (TD/TA) of less than 70,48% enhances firm value (ROE).  China 
Cuong and 
Canh 
(2012) 
Found that the optimal debt ratio (TD/TA) of less than 59.27% enhances firm value (ROE). 
Vietna
m 
Ahmad and 
Abdullah 
(2013) 
Found that the optimal leverage (ratio of total liabilities to total assets) of less than 64.33% that increases firm 
value (ROE).  
Malaysi
a 
Notes:  ROA = the return on assets; ROE = return on equity; Tobin’s Q = (Market value of equity + book value of debt)/ book value of assets; 
MBVR = Market value of equity/ Book value of equity; EPS = net income/ outstanding shares; SD/TA = short-term debt / total assets; LD/TA = 
Long- term debt / total assets; TD/TA = total debt / total assets; TD/TE = Total debt / total equity. 
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In summary, there is no universal theory of the debt-equity choice. Different views have been put forward regarding 
the financing choice. This research applies the threshold regression model of Hansen (1999) to construct the threshold 
regression model to investigate the effect of capital structure on firm value for Seafood Processing Enterprises in the 
South Central Region of Vietnam.  
3. Data and Variables 
3.1. Sample Description 
The sample of the study consists of 90 unlisted Seafood processing enterprises in the South Central region of Vietnam 
from 2005–2011. For some enterprises, collected data consists of balance sheets and annual business outcome reports. 
With the enterprises are collected across a period of 7 years, this study has 630 observations.  
3.2. Variables 
3.2.1. Firm Value  
Firm value has been measured through the accounting and market based proxies i.e. ROA, ROE, MBVR, Tobin’s Q 
and EPS by the previous studies. However, characteristics of Seafood processing enterprises in the South Central 
region of Vietnam are unlisted enterprises. The aforementioned argument suggests that the suitable firm value should 
be based on book value. This study has used book value of equity plus long- term debt supported by the studies of  
Samuel Antwi et al. (2012), OGBULU et al. (2012) and return on equity supported by the studies of Chien-Chung 
Nieh et al. (2008), Yu-Shu Cheng et al. (2010), Cuong and Canh (2012),  Ahmad and Abdullah (2013) as proxy of 
firm value. The measurement of firm value defined as below:  
BVE = Book Value of Equity + Long- term Debt 
ROE = 
Book value of  Earnings after taxes 
Book value of Equity 
3.2.2. Threshold and explanatory variables 
There are two categories of explanatory variables in my panel data and threshold regression model. One is the 
threshold variable, which is the key variable used to assess the optimal capital structure of a firm and to capture the 
threshold effect of debt on firm value. The threshold variable is a variable, when threshold variable is bigger or smaller 
than threshold value (γ), the samples can be divided into two groups, which can be expressed in different slopes β1 and 
β2. The  explanatory variable is a variable, reflecting its impact on the dependent variable. In the threshold regression 
model, explanatory variable impacts are not fixed but depends on the threshold value of the threshold variable. 
According to the “Trade-off Theory” of capital structure and the threshold regression model of Hansen (1999), the 
author assume that there exists an optimal capital structure for each Seafood Processing Enterprises in the South 
Central Region of Vietnam. 
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Following Feng-Li Lin (2007), Chien-Chung Nieh et al. (2008), Yu-Shu Cheng et al. (2010), Cuong and Canh (2012), 
the author use total debt to total assets (TD/TA) to represent the capital structure. It is the explanatory variable and 
also the threshold variable. The measurement of capital structure defined as below:  
TD/TA = 
Book value of Total debt 
Book value of Total assets 
 3.2.3. Control variables  
On the basis of previous studies, two control variables are used in this study includes enterprise size and firm’s 
growth. Following section will analyze interconnection between those variables relative to firm value.   
Enterprise size (SIZE) is considered one determinant of firm value. Joshua Abor (2005) suggest that enterprises of 
higher size generally have higher profitability. This suggests a positive relationship between the control variable 
(enterprise size) and profitability. On the other hand, researches by Yu-Shu Cheng et al. (2010) suggest that 
enterprises of higher size generally have lower firm value. This would suggest a negative relationship between the 
control variable (firm size) and firm value.  Regard to this variable, the author  suggest that enterprise size might have 
either positive or negative relationship with firm value. To measure enterprise size, Yu-Shu Cheng et al. (2010), 
Cuong and Canh (2012) have used natural log of total asses to measure the firm size. This study has also used natural 
log of total assets as proxy of firm size as below:  
SIZE = Ln(Book value of Total assets) 
Growth (SG) is considered to be a factor related to firm value. Joshua Abor (2005) suggest that enterprises of higher 
growth opportunities generally have higher profitability. Additionally, researches by Chien-Chung Nieh et al. (2008), 
Yu-Shu Cheng et al. (2010) suggest that enterprises of higher growth rate on operating sales generally have higher 
firm value. Regard to this variable, the author suggests a positive relationship between the control variable (growth) 
and firm value. To measure growth, previous studies have reported % change in total assets and % change in annual  
sales as measure of firm's growth rate. This study has used % change in annual sales as measure of growth rate of sales 
supported  by the studies of  Yu-Shu Cheng et al. (2010), Cuong and Canh (2012). The measurement of  growth ratio 
defined as below:  
SG = 
Total Annual revenue (t) –  Total Annual revenue (t-1) 
Total Annual revenue (t-1) 
4. Research Methodologies 
According to the “Trade-off Theory” of capital structure, when debt ratio increases, the interest tax shield increases. 
However, on the other side, leverage related costs increase to offset the positive effect of debt ratio to the firm value. 
Thus, this paper aims at examining whether threshold effect exists between the capital structure and value. The author 
assume that there exists an optimal debt ratio, and try to use threshold model to estimate this ratio, which can capture 
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the relationship between capital structure and firm value as well as help financial managers make decisions of 
enterprise capital structuring more suitably. This research applies the threshold regression model of Hansen (1999) and 
refer to the empirical study of  Chien-Chung Nieh et al. (2008), Yu-Shu Cheng et al. (2010), Cuong and Canh (2012) 
to construct the panel threshold regression model to investigate the effect of capital structure on firm value for Seafood 
Processing Enterprises in the South Central Region of Vietnam. The author constructed the following single threshold 
model: 
FV௜௧ = ൜
ߤ௜ + θ
ᇱܪ௜௧ + βଵ(TD/TA)௜௧ 	+	ߝ௜௧ 	, if	(TD/TA)௜௧ ≤ 	γ
ߤ௜ + θ
ᇱܪ௜௧ + βଶ(TD/TA)௜௧ 	+	ߝ௜௧ 	, if	(TD/TA)௜௧ > γ
 
Where θᇱ = (θଵ, θଶ)′ and H୧୲ = (SIZE୧୲, SG୧୲)′. (TD/TA)it is the explanatory variable and also the threshold variable; 
FVit represents firm value (ROEit and BVEit);  is the hypothesized specific threshold value. 1, 2 represent the 
coefficient estimates of the control variables. i is a given fixed effect used to grasp the heterogeneity of different 
companies under different operating conditions; 1 is the threshold coefficient when the threshold value is lower than 
; 2 is the threshold coefficient when the threshold value is higher than ; Error item εit must comply with the iid 
assumptions (eit ~ iid (0, σ
2)), where the average is 0, and variance is σ2; i represents different firms and t represents 
different periods.  
For the estimation procedures, the author first eliminate the individual effect i  using the “within Transformation” 
estimation techniques in the traditional fixed effect model of panel data. By using the ordinary least squares and 
minimizing the concentrated sum of squares of errors, Sଵ(γ), the author can obtain the estimators of our threshold 
value and the residual variance, ߛො and σෝଶ, respectively. 
For the testing procedures, first, the author have to go on to test the null hypothesis of no threshold effect, H0: 1 = 2 , 
which can be based on the likelihood ratio test: Fଵ = (S଴ − Sଵ(γො))/σෝ
ଶ, where S0 and Sଵ(γො) are sum of squared errors 
under null and alternative hypotheses, respectively. However, as the asymptotic distribution of  F1 is non-standard, the 
author use the procedure of bootstrap to construct the critical values and P-value.  
Upon the existence of threshold effect, H0: 1 ≠ 2 , the author should test for the asymptotic distribution of threshold 
estimate, H0:  = 0 , and adopt the likelihood ratio test: LRଵ = (Sଵ(γ) − Sଵ(γො))/σෝଶ		with the asymptotic confidence 
intervals: c(α) = −2log൫1 − √1 − α൯. 
If there exist double thresholds, the model can be modified as: 
FV௜௧ = ቐ
ߤ௜ + θ
ᇱܪ௜௧ + βଵ(TD/TA)௜௧ 	+ 	ߝ௜௧ 	, if	(TD/TA)௜௧ ≤	γଵ
ߤ௜ + θ
ᇱܪ௜௧ + βଶ(TD/TA)௜௧ 	+ 	ߝ௜௧ 	, if		γଵ < (TD/TA)௜௧ ≤ γଶ
ߤ௜ + θ
ᇱܪ௜௧ + βଷ(TD/TA)௜௧ 	+ 	ߝ௜௧ 	, if	(TD/TA)௜௧ > γଶ
 
Where threshold value 1 < 2. This can be extended to multiple (1, 2, 3, …, n).  
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5. Empirical Results 
5.1. Descriptive Statistics 
Table 2 represents the descriptive statistics of all variable in this study. Financial information was collected from 
balance sheets and annual business outcome reports of 90 unlisted Seafood Processing Enterprises in the South Central 
region of Vietnam during 2005–2011 period.  
Results of descriptive statistics in table 2 show that: Firm value by average BVE and ROE of SEASCRs are 22.9077 
(equivalent to 32.14 billions VND) and 2.92%. The mean of debt ratio (TD/TA) of SEASCRs is 59.39%. Size by 
average assets (SIZE) of SEASCRs is 23.7785 (equivalent to 69.86 billions VND). Growth rate of operating sales 
(SG) of SEASCRs is 5.28%. Table 2 also includes median value, minimum value, maximum value, standard deviation 
and no. of observations.  
Table 2. Descriptive Statistics 
 
Variables Observations Mean Median Maximum Minimum Std. Dev. 
BVEit 630 22.9077 22.8343 19.7322 28.2582 1.4824 
ROEit 630 0.0292 0.0303 -1.5442 0.8785 0.2104 
(TD/TA)it 630 0.5939 0.6397 0.0192 0.9832 0.2326 
SIZEit 630 23.7785 23.7311 20.3455 28.5690 1.5208 
SGit 630 0.0528 0.0832 -2.3901 2.6893 0.5033 
Notes:  Std. Dev. denotes standard deviation, ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
5.2. Panel unit root test results 
Hansen’s (1999) panel threshold regression model is an extension of the traditional least squared estimation method, 
in fact. It requires that variables considered in the model need to be stationary in order to avoid the so-called spurious 
regression. Thus, the unit root test is first processed in this study. The null hypothesis of non-stationary versus the 
alternative in which variable is stationary, was tested using the group mean panel unit root test. 
Table 3. Panel unit-root test results 
  
Variables 
LLC IPS 
t-statistic P-value z-statistic P-value 
BVEit -21,6564 0.0000*** -3,9952 0.0000*** 
ROEit -9,1806 0.0000*** -5,5745 0.0000*** 
(TD/TA)it -18,0200 0.0000*** -2,7747 0.0000*** 
SIZEit -14,2492 0.0000*** -3,9675 0.0000*** 
SGit -20,9811 0.0000*** -7,3985 0.0000*** 
Notes:   LLC and  IPS  represent the Levin et al. (2002) and Im et al. (2003) panel unit-root test, respectively. ***, ** and * indicate significance at 
the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
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Table 3 represents the result of Levin et al. (2002) and IPS ADF (Im et al., 2003) and shows that all variables are 
stationary at level as P-values are indicating the rejection of null hypothesis. Accordingly, the author proceed with full 
analysis.  
5.3. Tests of threshold effect 
In this study, the author follow the bootstrap method proposed by Hansen (1999) to obtain the approximations of the F 
statistics and then calculate the p-values. The bootstrap procedure is repeated 1000 times for each of the three panel 
threshold tests. The F statistics contains F1, F2 and F3 to assess the null hypotheses of none, one and two thresholds, 
respectively. Table 4 presents the test statistics F1, F2, and F3, along with their bootstrap P-values.  
Table 4. Tests for threshold effects between the debt ratio and proxy variables for firm value 
 
Firm value variables Threshold value  
F-statistic Test critical values 
F-stat P-value 1% 5% 10% 
Single threshold effect test  
BVEit 0.6381 211.30 0.00*** 24.13 15.95 13.58 
ROEit 0.8998 35.08 0.00*** 22.35 18.95 15.17 
Double threshold effect test  
BVEit 0.5739   0.7867 97.20 0.00*** 23.08 16.81 13.97 
ROEit 0.5793   0.8998 20.31 0.03** 24.54 15.96 13.60 
Triple threshold effect test 
BVEit 0.5739   0.7867   0.9230  63.08 0.00*** 24.08 16.18 13.46 
ROEit 0.5396   0.5793   0.8998 9.97 0.19 20.08 13.50 12.03 
Notes:  F-statistics and p-values are from repeating bootstrap procedures 1000 times for each of the three bootstrap tests. ***, ** and * indicate 
significance at the 1, 5 and 10% level, respectively.  
Results of tests for threshold effects between the debt ratio and proxy variables for firm value in table 4 show that:  
Regarding BVE as a proxy for firm value, the single threshold effect is first tested to see if it exists. By using 
bootstrap to make 1000 times, F-tatistics (F1) of  211.30 and P-value of 0.00 are respectively yielded. They show 
significance under 1% significant level and reject the null hypothesis of no threshold effect. Likewise, bootstrap is 
used to make 1000 times and respectively yields F-statistics (F2) of 97.20 and P-value of 0.00. They show significance 
under a 1% significant level and reject the null hypothesis of one threshold. Finally, triple-threshold effect is tested to 
see if it exists. Similarly, bootstrap is used to make 1000 times and respective yields F-statistics (F3) of 63.08 and  P-
value of  0.00. The results reject the null hypothesis of two thresholds, suggesting the possibility of three thresholds. In 
conclusion, the aforementioned statistic analysis articulately shows that an asymmetric relationship of three thresholds 
in four regimes is significantly formed. Table 4 also presents the estimated values of three thresholds, which are 
57.39%, 78.67% and 92.30%, respectively. All observations are objectively and passively split into four regimes 
depending on whether the threshold variable it (TD/TA)it is smaller or larger than the threshold value (ߛොଵ, ߛොଶ , ߛොଷ). 
Accordingly, the author define four regimes formed by three threshold values to be low debt, medium debt, high debt 
Nguyen Thanh Cuong /International Journal of Finance & Banking Studies Vol 3, No 3 , 2014  ISSN: 2147-4486 
23 
 
and very high debt if their debt ratio within the ranges (0.00% – 57.39%), (57.39% – 78.67%), (78.67% – 92.30%) and 
exceed 92.30%. The figure of appendix 1 shows the confidence interval construction in single threshold, double 
threshold and triple threshold.  
Regarding ROE as proxy of firm value, the single threshold effect is first tested to see if it exists. By using bootstrap 
to make 1000 times, F-tatistics (F1) of  35.08 and P-value of 0.00 are respectively yielded. They show significance 
under 1% significant level and reject the null hypothesis of no threshold effect. Likewise, bootstrap is used to make 
1000 times and respectively yields F-statistics (F2) of  20.31 and P-value of  0.03. They show significance under a 5% 
significant level and reject the null hypothesis of one threshold. Finally, triple-threshold effect is tested to see if it 
exists. Similarly, bootstrap is used to make 1000 times and respective yields F-statistics (F3) of 9.97 and  P-value of  
0.19. The results reject the null hypothesis of three  thresholds. In conclusion, the aforementioned statistic analysis 
articulately shows that an asymmetric relationship of two thresholds in three regimes is significantly formed. Table 4 
also presents the estimated values of two thresholds, which are 57.93% and 89.98%, respectively. All observations are 
objectively and passively split into three regimes depending on whether the threshold variable it (TD/TA)it is smaller 
or larger than the threshold value (ߛොଵ, ߛොଶ). Accordingly, the author define three regimes formed by two threshold 
values to be debt  if their debt ratio within the ranges (0.00% – 57.93%), (57.93% – 89.98%) and exceed 89.98%. The 
figure of appendix 2 shows the confidence interval construction in single threshold, double threshold.  
Table 5. Estimated coefficients of firm value for each proxy variable for the firm value 
 
Firm value variables Coefficients Estimated value OLS SE White SE tOLS tWhite 
BVEit  
ߚመଵ 0.2963 0.1053 0.1085 2.8139*** 2.7309*** 
ߚመଶ -0.4109 0.0971 0.0980 -4.2317*** -4.1929*** 
ߚመଷ -0.9661 0.1013 0.1070 -9.5370*** -9.0290*** 
ߚመସ -1.6929 0.1413 0.1906 -11.9809*** -8.8820*** 
ROEit 
ߚመଵ 0.1488 0.0686 0.0745 2.1691** 1.9978** 
ߚመଶ -0.0043 0.0624 0.0591 -0.0692 -0.0731 
ߚመଷ -0.3128 0.0841 0.1176 -3.7185*** -2.6606*** 
Notes: ߚመଵ, ߚመଶ, ߚመଷ are the coefficient estimates that are smaller and larger than the threshold value  . OLS SE and White SE represent conventional 
OLS SEs (considering homoscedasticity) and White-corrected SEs (considering heteroscedasticity), respectively. ***, ** and * indicate significance 
at the 1, 5 and 10% level, respectively. 
Table 5 shows the estimated coefficients, conventional OLS standard errors, and White-corrected standard errors for 
each proxy variable for the firm value. The results in table 5 show that:  
Regarding BVE as a proxy for firm value, in the first regime when debt ratio is less than 57.39%, the estimated 
coefficient of BVE (ߚመଵ = 0.2963) is positive and significant at the 1% level, indicating that BVE increases by 0.2963% 
with an increase of 1% in debt ratio. The negative effects of debt on firm value are found in the second, third and last 
regime, respectively. In the second regime, where the debt ratio is between 57.39% and 78.67%, the estimated 
coefficient of BVE (ߚመଶ = -0.4109) is negative and significant at the 1% level, indicating that BVE decreases by 
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0.4109% with an increase of  1% in debt ratio. In the third regime, where the debt ratio is between 78.67% and 92.30%, 
the estimated coefficient of BVE (ߚመଷ = -0.9661) is negative and significant at the 1% level, indicating that BVE 
decreases by 0.9661% with an increase of  1% in debt ratio. In the last regime, where the debt ratio is greater than 
92.30%, the estimated coefficient of BVE (ߚመସ = -1.6929) is negative and significant at the 1% level, indicating that 
BVE decreases by 1.6929% with an increase of  1% in debt ratio.  
Regarding ROE as a proxy for firm value, in the first regime when debt ratio is less than 57.93%, the estimated 
coefficient of BVE (ߚመଵ = 0.1488) is positive and significant at the 5% level, indicating that ROE increases by 0.1488% 
with an increase of 1% in debt ratio. The negative effects of debt on firm value are found in the second and last 
regime, respectively. In the second regime, where the debt ratio is between 57.93% and 89.98%, the estimated 
coefficient of ROE (ߚመଶ = -0.0043) is negative and insignificant, indicating that there is no relationship between debt 
ratio and firm value. In the third regime, where the debt ratio is greater than 89.98%, the estimated coefficient of ROE 
(ߚመଷ = -0.3128) is negative and significant at the 1% level, indicating that ROE decreases by 0.3128% with an increase 
of  1% in debt ratio.  
Therefore, the results clearly suggest that the relationship between debt ratio and firm value (that is, the slope value) 
varies in accordance with different changes in debt structure, and that debt structure has a nonlinear relationship with 
firm value. 
Table 6. Estimated coefficients of control variables for each proxy variable for the firm value 
 
Firm value variables Coefficients Estimated value OLS SE White SE tOLS tWhite 
BVEit 
θ෠ଵ 0.9834 0.0261 0.0339 37.6782*** 29.0088*** 
θ෠ଶ 0.0017 0.0231 0.0242 0.0736 0.0702 
ROEit  
θ෠ଵ 0.0259 0.0171 0.0148 1.5174 1.7509* 
θ෠ଶ 0.0189 0.0151 0.0142 1.2492 1.3272 
Notes: θ෠ଵ, θ෠ଶ	represent estimated coefficients of firm size, growth rate of operating sales. OLS SE and White SE represent conventional OLS SEs 
(considering homoscedasticity) and White-corrected SEs (considering heteroscedasticity), respectively. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1, 
5 and 10% level, respectively. 
Table 6 presents the estimated coefficients of two control variables, conventional OLS standard errors, and White-
corrected standard errors for each proxy variable for the firm value. The results in table 6 show that:  
Regarding BVE as a proxy for firm value, the estimated coefficient of firm size (θ෠ଵ = 0.9834) is positive and 
significant at the 1% level, indicating that BVE increases by 0.9834% with an increase of 1% in firm size. The 
estimated coefficient of growth rate of operating sales (θ෠ଶ = 0.0017) is positive and is insignificant, indicating that 
there is no relationship between growth rate of operating sales and firm value.  
Regarding ROE as a proxy for firm value, the estimated coefficient of firm size (θ෠ଵ = 0.0259) is positive and 
significant at the 10% level, indicating that ROE increases by 0.0259% with an increase of 1% in firm size. The 
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estimated coefficient of growth rate of operating sales (θ෠ଶ = 0.0189) is positive and is insignificant, indicating that 
there is no relationship between growth rate of operating sales and firm value.  
Therefore, the results clearly suggest that, the size of  total assets have a significantly positive effect on firm value, 
implying that the greater the size of  total assets, that a firm have, the higher its firm value. Moreover, the growth rate 
of operating sales are shown to have no significant effect on firm value. This implies that expanding growth rate of 
operating sales does not necessarily increase firm value.  
5.4. Estimated Model  
Based on empirical findings, following is the estimated model when total debt to total assets (TD/TA) are taken as 
proxy of capital structure and BVE as a proxy for firm value: 
 BVE௜௧ = ൞
ߤ௜ + 0.9834	SIZE௜௧ + 0.0017	SG௜௧ + 0.2963(TD/TA)௜௧ 	+ 	ߝ௜௧ 	, if	(TD/TA)௜௧ ≤ 0.5739
ߤ௜ + 0.9834	SIZE௜௧ + 0.0017	SG௜௧ − 0.4109(TD/TA)௜௧ 	+ 	ߝ௜௧ 	, if		0.5739 < (TD/TA)௜௧ ≤ 0.7867
ߤ௜ + 0.9834	SIZE௜௧ + 0.0017	SG௜௧ − 0.9661(TD/TA)௜௧ 	+ 	ߝ௜௧ 	, if		0.7867 < (TD/TA)௜௧ ≤ 0.9230
ߤ௜ + 0.9834	SIZE௜௧ + 0.0017	SG௜௧ − 1.6929(TD/TA)௜௧ 	+ 	ߝ௜௧ 	, if	(TD/TA)௜௧ > 0.9230
 
The empirical results strongly indicate that triple threshold effect exists between debt ratio and firm value when BVE 
is selected to proxy firm value. Besides, the coefficient is positive when debt ratio is less than 57.39%, which implies 
that debt financing can improve firm value. The coefficient is negative and presents a decreasing trend when the debt 
ratio is between 57.39% and 78,67% or between 78.67% and 92.30% or above 92.30%, implying that, in that regime, 
a further increase in debt financing, deteriorates firm value.  
Following is the estimated model when total debt to total assets (TD/TA) are taken as proxy of capital structure and 
ROE as a proxy for firm value: 
ROE௜௧ = ቐ
ߤ௜ + 0.0259	SIZE௜௧ + 0.0189	SG௜௧ + 0.1488(TD/TA)௜௧ 	+ 	ߝ௜௧ 	, if	(TD/TA)௜௧ ≤ 0.5793
ߤ௜ + 0.0259	SIZE௜௧ + 0.0189	SG௜௧ − 0.0043(TD/TA)௜௧ 	+ 	ߝ௜௧ 	, if		0.5793 < (TD/TA)௜௧ ≤ 0.8998
ߤ௜ + 0.0259	SIZE௜௧ + 0.0189	SG௜௧ − 0.3128(TD/TA)௜௧ 	+ 	ߝ௜௧ 	, if	(TD/TA)௜௧ > 0.8998
 
When ROE is selected to proxy firm value, the result shows that there exists double thresholds effect between debt 
ratio and firm value. Besides, the coefficient is positive when debt ratio is less than 57.93%, which implies that debt 
financing can improve firm value. The coefficient is negative and presents a decreasing trend when the debt ratio is 
between 57.93% and 89.98% or above 89.98%, implying that, in that regime, a further increase in debt financing, 
deteriorates firm value.  
From the above results, the author may conclude that the relationship between capital structure and firm value has a 
nonlinear relationship represents an convex Parapol shape. In addition, it is concluded that there exists an optimal debt 
ratio is less than 57.39% that increases firm value. These findings are consistent with the trade-off theory (Myers, 
1977), Chien-Chung Nieh et al. (2008), Yu-Shu Cheng et al. (2010), Cuong and Canh (2012), Ahmad and Abdullah 
(2013) for which firm may search a “balance” that the interest tax shield is equal to the incremental costs through debt 
financing. The size of  total assets have a significantly positive effect on firm value, implying that the greater the size 
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of total assets, that a firm have, the higher its firm value. However, the growth rate of operating sales are shown to 
have no significant effect on firm value. This implies that expanding growth rate of operating sales does not 
necessarily increase firm value.  
6. Conclusions and Implications  
The capital structure decision is crucial for any business organization. The decision is important because of the need to 
maximize returns to various organizational constituencies, and also because of the impact such a decision has on an 
organization’s ability to deal with its competitive environment. This study uses the advanced panel threshold 
regression model to examine the panel threshold effect of capital structure on firm value among 90 unlisted Seafood 
Processing Enterprises in the South Central region of Vietnam during 2005–2011 period. The findings of the study 
shows the presence of triple threshold effect of debt ratio on firm value when BVE is selected to proxy firm value. 
However, when ROE is selected to proxy firm value, the result shows that there exists double thresholds effect 
between debt ratio and firm value. From these results, the author  may conclude that the relationship between capital 
structure and firm value has a nonlinear relationship represents an convex Parapol shape. In addition, this study 
provides new evidence on the existence of threshold debt ratio of  57.39 % for unlisted Seafood Processing Enterprises 
in the South Central region of Vietnam. This result supports the trade-off theory and the findings of previous authors, 
also as author's hypothesis in this study, implying that there exists an optimal capital structure for each enterprise.  For 
the control variables, according to empirical results, the size of  total assets have a significantly positive effect on firm 
value. This finding supports author's hypothesis in this study, implying that the greater the size of total assets, that a 
firm have, the higher its firm value. However, the growth rate of operating sales are shown to have no significant 
effect on firm value. This finding not supports author's hypothesis in this study, implying that expanding growth rate 
of operating sales does not necessarily increase firm value.  
From the above mentioned findings, there will be several implications for Seafood Processing Enterprises in the South 
Central region of Vietnam in using financial leverage. Firstly, SEASCRs should not use loans over 57.39%. To ensure 
and enhance the firm value, the scope of the optimal debt ratio should be less than 57.39%. Secondly, for SEASCRs 
currently have debt ratios greater than 57.39%, managers can apply the models that are developed here in order to set a 
target level, and then gradually move towards it so as to maximize firm value. Thirdly, the firms using debt below 
optimal range may employ more debt to get the benefits of tax shield that increases the firm value.  
Financial statements of most unlisted Seafood Processing Enterprises in the South Central region of Vietnam are not 
audited. The availability and reliability of financial data was a major limitation for this research. Therefore, the 
enterprise value is not measured by the market value.  In the future, the enterprise value will be measured by market 
value. Future research could also consider the effect of specific industries, ownership and market variables, with the 
aim of examining the effect of such variables on the firm's value in Vietnam. 
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Appendix 1. Tests for threshold effects between capital structure (TD/TA) and firm value (BVE)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix 2. Tests for threshold effects between capital structure (TD/TA) and firm value (ROE)  
 
